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Analytic Outreach for Intelligence:   
Insights from a Workshop on Emerging Biotechnology Threats 
 
 
Abstract: This article describes a new effort to engage in analytic outreach between 
academic scholars and intelligence analysts on the issue of emerging biotechnology threats to 
U.S. national security.  The context of this outreach was a September 2012 meeting in London to 
explore possibilities for enhanced analytic outreach in relation to emerging biotechnology 
threats, supported by the UK Genomics Policy and Research Forum.  This meeting consisted of a 
mix of current and former intelligence practitioners and policy officials, and social science and 
scientific experts, from both countries. As will be described below, this unique pairing of experts 
and subjects revealed new insights into how to improve intelligence assessments on 
biotechnology and bioweapons threats. It also revealed continuing challenges in reforming 
assessments within existing intelligence work routines. 
 
In July 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued ‘Intelligence 
Community Directive Number 205 (ICD 205): Analytic Outreach,’ which calls for intelligence 
analysts to ‘leverage outside expertise as part of their work.’1  These experts are identified as 
being drawn from ‘academia; think tanks; industry; nongovernmental organizations; the 
scientific world (e.g., U.S. government laboratories, national academies, national research 
councils, and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers); state, local, and tribal 
governments; other non-Intelligence Community U.S. government agencies; and elsewhere.’2  
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With this mandate, analysts are expected to know the leading experts in their portfolios and to 
seek opportunities to engage openly with them to ‘explore ideas and alternative perspectives, 
gain new insights, generate new knowledge, or obtain new information.’3 The directive 
recognizes the importance of moving analysts out of their classified domains to tap into valuable 
outside knowledge and relevant expertise and to challenge assumptions, cultural biases, and 
conventional wisdom that can occur in intelligence.4 Currently, however, the directive remains 
underutilized because, as one intelligence analyst explains, it is ‘pretty much an unfunded 
mandate.’5 Although the directive demonstrates high-level support for increased intelligence 
outreach, it leaves the implementation up to each individual agency and office unit, which ‘few 
do given limited resources and some bureaucratic obstacles (e.g., security clearances, identifying 
and justifying suitable academics or other experts).’6   
 In spite of these challenges, we have been interested in exploring the benefit that analytic 
outreach could have on an issue of current intelligence concern: emerging biotechnology threats 
to U.S. national security.  Since the end of the Cold War and the rise of asymmetric security 
threats, the U.S. intelligence and policy communities have been increasingly concerned about 
new types of bioweapons attacks that might arise from a spectrum of state and non-state actors.  
In talking about these concerns at a 1995 U.S. Senate hearing, CIA official Gordon Oehler 
lamented that ‘the increasingly troubled post-Cold War world has, in a curious way, made us 
yearn for the dark days of the 1960s and 1970s when we knew the kind of target we were dealing 
with and the problems we were facing.’7  With the events of 11 September 2001, new scientific 
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developments, and the globalization and diffusion of biotechnology, the number of possible 
threats has continued to grow.8  More recently, further concerns have arisen that advances in the 
life sciences and biotechnology have made bioweapons capabilities accessible to an increasing 
number of actors, including possible garage bio-hackers, ‘mad scientists’, and bio-criminals.9 
In this context, fundamental analytic questions have arisen for intelligence about how to 
assess bioweapons threats in the coming years:   
• How exactly do advances in the life sciences and 
biotechnology affect the nature of the bioweapons threat in the 
coming years and decades?  
• What are the specific knowledge, skills, conditions, resources, 
and time scales that enable the development of new 
biotechnologies and biological weapons?   
• Moving from the global to the local, how can one better assess 
the ways in which a diverse set of actors may develop and use 
biotechnologies for harm? 
The ability of intelligence to tackle these questions and inform policy depends a great deal on 
how analysts understand and assess the factors and context that enable biotechnology and 
bioweapons activities to develop and proliferate.   
To date, much is still not known about the fundamental drivers of emerging 
biotechnology and bioweapons threats, how they apply to specific actors and cases, and how 
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these drivers are changing over time.  Additional analytic challenges stem from the complexity 
of biological systems and the difficulty in predicting how innovations and discoveries in the life 
sciences and related technologies can be controlled and harnessed for misuse---and how, and to 
what extent, this is a different problem than that posed by older bioweapons threats.  Until these 
fundamental issues are examined in depth, intelligence analysts will face blind spots in their 
bioweapons assessments, which may lead to future intelligence failures and poor national and 
international security policymaking.   
 
 
ANALYTIC OUTREACH AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Previous writing on analytic outreach that has focused on the life sciences has discussed 
the ‘nearly nonexistent’ relationship between the life science and intelligence communities, and 
the need to build ‘solid and long lasting’ bridges.10 This was in relation to the publication or 
control of scientific research findings that might be used for bioterrorism or bioweapons 
development. In this paper we move away from considering only technical matters to focus on 
the benefits and challenges of engagement between intelligence and the social sciences.  This is 
an area that has received far less attention and funding than engagements between scientists and 
intelligence, but poses more complexities for analysis.11  Thus, we build on these recent calls for 
‘consistent and productive interaction’ between scientists (here, social scientists) and the 
intelligence community.12 We agree that the benefits of ongoing dialogue and improved 
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relationships will be multiple, including (especially) access to, and mobility of, expertise across 
the two groups.    
Over the last decade, research and higher education policy in North America, the UK and 
elsewhere has increasingly prioritized and incentivized ‘research impact’ and the development of 
academic connections with external stakeholders, including in the social sciences.13 In the UK 
and US, for example, reporting and funding processes by (respectively) the Research Councils 
and the National Science Foundation have increasingly shifted toward assessing the application 
and impact of research outside academia.14 Moreover, in the U.S., there have been recent calls to 
increase engagement between social scientists and those in intelligence and the military.15 These 
shifts at the policy level in diverse countries build on longer-term research and increasing interest 
in ‘knowledge exchange’ – the process of exchanging knowledge through dialogue with non-
academic stakeholders, notably government departments and agencies.16 In the context of social 
science research on bioweapons threats and bioterrorism, the intelligence community is a key 
non-academic stakeholder. The increasing emphasis on knowledge exchange and research 
impact in the social sciences over the last five-to-ten years may be seen to mirror the directive to 
the intelligence community in the same period to increase analytic outreach, discussed in the 
introduction to this paper. The current policy context for both intelligence analysis and social 
science thus has the effect of drawing the intelligence and social science communities closer 
together from both sides.   
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One effect of the research policy context in the UK has been the funding of dedicated 
‘knowledge broker’ units and posts within universities, to facilitate relationships and dialogue 
between researchers and non-academic stakeholders.17 In this context the UK Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) in 2004 funded the Genomics Policy and Research Forum, a 
novel initiative dedicated to the development of links between social scientists and scientists 
working in the contemporary life sciences, and the connection of research in this area to 
policymakers, business, the media and civil society. The Forum’s remit covers a wide range of 
topics in the contemporary life sciences, including biotechnological developments such as 
genetically modified crops, and stem cell research. A key aspect of the Forum’s program has 
been to convene cross-sector stakeholder workshops on specific topics, providing a ‘safe space’ 
for initiating dialogue across professional, cultural and ideological boundaries, with a view to 
long-term relationship building.18  
 
US-UK JOINT WORKSHOP ON IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FOR 
EMERGING BIOTECHNOLOGY THREATS 
In the context of this mission and work, the Genomics Policy and Research Forum 
therefore supported a September 2012 meeting in London to explore possibilities for enhanced 
analytic outreach in relation to emerging biotechnology threats, led by co-author [removed for 
anonymity] in [his/her] capacity as Genomics Forum “Bright Ideas” Visiting Fellow.19 This 
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meeting consisted of a mix of current and former intelligence practitioners and policy officials 
and social science and scientific experts from both countries.20 The workshop was designed to:  
(1) examine new analytic approaches that take into account both 
social and technical factors in assessing emerging bioweapons and 
biotechnology threats;  
(2) create a new forward-looking dialogue and intellectual 
exchange between intelligence practitioners and academic experts 
on how both communities can think more holistically about 
bioweapons threats; and  
(3) challenge the conventional wisdom that substantive discussions 
of analytic methods for bioweapons threats can only occur in 
highly classified settings.   
As will be described below, this unique pairing of experts and subjects revealed new insights into 
how to improve intelligence assessments on biotechnology and bioweapons threats. It also 
revealed continuing challenges in reforming assessments within existing intelligence work 
routines.  
CRITICAL WORKSHOP FINDINGS 
The workshop presentations and discussions identified two main issues worthy of 
intelligence attention:  (1) the need for better conceptual models for understanding biotechnology 
development; and (2) the challenges of integrating these models (or any new analytic 
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approaches) into existing intelligence culture and work practices.  Underlying and linking these 
two issues, an important workshop finding was that it is essential to understand the context in 
which knowledge about biotechnology threats is produced and used. This context affects the 
ways in which intelligence practitioners collect, structure, classify, organize, and transfer data on 
potential threats.   
1. TWO BIOTECHNOLOGY MODELS 
A key panel at the workshop, entitled ‘Understanding the Emerging Life Science 
Landscape,’ examined two different models for explaining innovations in biotechnology and the 
life sciences.21  One well-known model, the biotech revolution model, was described at the 
workshop by Gerald Epstein, Homeland Security Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Policy.  The ‘biotech revolution’ model 
emphasizes codified knowledge in biology and the material aspects of biotechnology, and 
assumes that biotechnologies develop with a fixed linear or exponential technological trajectory. 
Proponents of this model view biotechnologies as becoming more available due to the 
widespread geographical diffusion of biotechnology information, materials, infrastructure, and 
expertise across a wide range of commercial and academic settings.  Biotechnology is seen as 
becoming more powerful, available, familiar, and decentralized.  This model assumes that 
technology is the primary driver and that states, terrorists, or other non-state actors will readily 
exploit modern biological materials and techniques to lower technical barriers, obviate existing 
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controls, and create vulnerabilities for harm. Under this model, the bioweapons threat is expected 
to grow in the future.   
An alternative model, which could be dubbed the ‘biotech evolution’ model, was 
presented by University of Sheffield Professor of Sociology Paul Martin.  This model focuses on 
the complex social, economic, scientific, and technical factors that shape biotech innovation and 
its applications – factors that can powerfully modulate potential bioweapons threats.22 This 
model, based on decades of in-depth qualitative academic social science research, some 
involving longitudinal (20-30 year) case studies covering a range of biotechnologies, reveals a 
slower, multifaceted, and non-linear model for biotechnology development than the biotech 
revolution model.  This is because biotechnological development occurs within social, natural, 
economic, and political contexts, and as a result, biotechnologies can develop in a number of 
different ways.  This analytic approach studies local technical practices, as well as the larger 
laboratory, institutional, industrial, and environmental settings in which technologies are 
developed and used. These studies reveal that in the small number of cases where specific 
biotechnology products and innovations have emerged and been successful, this was the result of 
many decades of incremental collaborative research. Typically, it has taken 35 years for new 
biotechnology innovations to mature and be useful. While these case studies focused on 
commercial biotechnology rather than biological weapons development, they reveal patterns that 
may be common to all life science developments.  Thus, these scholarly case studies demonstrate 
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a different picture and understanding of biotechnology, its patterns of innovation, diffusion, 
translation, and uptake, that are worthy of serious consideration for intelligence.23   
At the London workshop, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Assistant Professor in the 
Biodefense program at George Mason University, also drew on aspects of the biotech evolution 
model. She discussed how in her unclassified study of state and terrorist bioweapons programs, 
she found several very important ‘intangible’ factors in determining whether a group or state will 
successfully conduct scientific work and produce a weapon.24  These factors go beyond purely 
technical issues, and involve the work organization, program management, structural 
organization, and the broader social environment that constitutes a weapons program.  
For example, Gormley states that tacit knowledge (otherwise referred to as “know-how”), 
not just explicit knowledge, is important for bioweapons work − this kind of knowledge cannot 
be captured in codified forms, but involves the development of hands-on scientific know-how. 
Also, Gormley relates that technical developments, particularly in large scale technical projects, 
are the result of the cumulative and cooperative endeavors of teams of scientists, rather than just 
one scientist. Therefore, it is unlikely that one scientist could support a state/terrorist bioweapons 
program because their individual knowledge is not sufficient. Finally, scientific knowledge does 
not transfer easily—successful transfer typically requires some work to adjust the knowledge to 
the new location. Therefore, Gormley’s overall take away message is that if we really want to 
understand whether and how successful/rapidly a state or non-state actor can produce a 
bioweapons program, we need to understand how these actors manage knowledge.  
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Gormley illustrated the importance of these factors by discussing differences between the 
U.S. and Soviet bioweapons programs. For example, the US bioweapons program had “multiple 
knowledge transmission belts”; that is, the management devised multiple mechanisms to share 
tacit knowledge among its team members. In contrast, the Soviet bioweapons program was much 
more fragmented due to its concerns over secrecy. Much of Soviet bioweapons work was 
compartmentalized, with multiple barriers to knowledge transfer. Although the Soviet 
bioweapons program was larger and lasted 60 years, which is much longer compared to the U.S. 
bioweapons program which existed for 25 years, the Soviets had problems in their weapons 
development due to this fragmentation of knowledge that ultimately prevented them from using 
the knowledge that they had within their own organization.25 The U.S. bioweapons program was 
more successful in terms of managing knowledge than the Soviet program because the U.S. 
program was built as an integrated program with mechanisms for transferring knowledge 
between individuals and locations. For example, when a team member developed a product, this 
member went to the next research and development stage and would help those team members 
with any problems that they encountered. There were a few examples of Soviet management 
officials and institutes that mitigated the impact of Soviet rigidity for knowledge transfer, and 
these institutes were more successful and innovative in their weapons work compared to the 
more autocratic managerial styles that were the norm.  
Gormley has also look at the role of intangible factors in smaller bioweapons programs, 
such as that of the Japanese religious group Aum Shinrikyo, as well as South Africa. Gormley 
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finds that the South African program was mostly an assassination program (not a large scale 
weapons program), although it did have the expertise, budget, independence, and time necessary 
to develop potent weapons. However, little innovation resulted within this program. Gormley 
attributes this to the Soviet style management model that structured the South African program 
that limited the development and transfer of scientific knowledge.  Chandre Gould, a scholar at 
the meeting who has spent over a decade investigating the South African state chemical and 
biological weapons program, also noted that the South African bioweapons program was largely 
a pedestrian effort.  She believes (related to Gormley’s presentation) that the secret nature of the 
South African program, where fear and suspicion prevailed, mitigated against creativity and 
productivity of the program. Through her research, Gormley found that the most vulnerable 
phase of a weapons program is the stage of knowledge accumulation, which involves important 
management dimensions that structure the technical work.  She argued that intelligence and 
policy practitioners should focus on these intangible factors, and design and implement policies 
and programs that prevent or frustrate the use and transfer of weapons knowledge in the 
knowledge accumulation phase of a weapons program.   
In spite of the purported ease of using biotechnology for harm, an intelligence 
practitioner (here referred to anonymously as IP1) commented at the workshop that even the 
most gifted bio-hackers face problems in producing a working weapon.26  IP1 noted that one of 
the great downsides of ‘off-the-shelf’ technology is that if the technology doesn’t work in the lab 
or garage as expected, it can be very difficult to determine and fix the problem, precisely for the 
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reason that the technologies are ‘off-the-shelf’ and ‘black-boxed’ – the users may not possess the 
know-how to fix the underlying technical problem.  Moreover, IP1 noted that there is also the 
inescapable reality of biological complexity. Viruses or bacteria, because they are living 
organisms with particular growth and environmental sensitivities, are not guaranteed to do what 
the weapons developer expects; even sophisticated state bioweapons programs have encountered 
these problems.  IP1 also emphasized the challenges of effective delivery and dissemination of 
the biological agents that are also required for a mass casualty bioweapons attack.  This 
requirement necessitates other kinds of weapons expertise, such as materials science and 
engineering knowledge to construct a workable weapon.  
Those at the workshop who have conducted in-depth study of the social, organizational, 
economic, and historical dimensions of biotechnological development argued that the biotech 
revolution model is the wrong conceptual paradigm for understanding change and innovation in 
biotechnology and bioweapons threats.  They called for a different conceptual model, such as the 
one described by Paul Martin, for understanding biotechnology development: one that is rooted 
in ideas of slow incremental innovation that integrates complex social, economic, environmental, 
and technical factors, and that takes a critical stance toward the high expectations that often 
characterize the rhetoric in the life science and biotechnology fields.27  This alternative 
evolutionary framework is based on in-depth, longitudinal, and multi-disciplinary perspectives 
that focus on the socio-technical dimensions of how technological development, diffusion, and 
adoption occurs involving important micro-(laboratory) and macro-(industries, nations, regions, 
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and global) level considerations. This analytic approach involves studying the detailed technical 
practices and related knowledge-generating activities that constitute the laboratory work for 
these technologies, as well as the larger organizational, national, and transnational contexts and 
time periods in which this work is situated.   
 Further, these talks and discussions at the workshop usefully highlighted the need to 
move away from thinking of biotechnology as a specific object or individual artifact, but instead 
as a socio-technical network comprised of both material and social things.  Some useful 
questions that emerged from this discussion:  
• How does one develop, stabilize, and sustain a socio-technical 
network to achieve a particular biotechnology 
product/application?  
• What other circumstances and conditions are required (e.g., 
knowledge, training, teams, management, infrastructure)?   
• How do we understand the different social actors in the 
networks and their complex connections?   
• How can we better learn about scientific networks through 
micro-level studies of foreign scientific literature and scientific 
communities?   
• What is involved in embedding knowledge in different kinds of 
networks (e.g., terrorist versus state)?  
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The outcome of these presentations and subsequent discussions was to highlight the need 
for a better, more refined conceptual model for explaining modes of, and changes in, technology 
development and transfer in biotechnology and the life sciences, and how these map onto 
specific threats, taking into account important social, economic, and organizational factors in 
addition to technical issues.  In addition, discussions also emphasized that analysts need to pay 
attention to underlying assumptions about biotechnology and make room for diversity of 
hypotheses at any given time. Moreover, there is value in analysts interrogating what is absent 
from existing technological models and paradigms.  For example, what kinds of social 
engineering (e.g., pedagogy, exchanges, teams, organization and management structures) is 
necessary for the development, diffusion, and use of specific biotechnologies for harm?  What 
particular local conditions, practices contribute to the failure to develop these technologies?28  
What about crude or low tech bioweapons threats?  How do the social requirements change when 
considering these lower tech threats? Both quantitative and qualitative research methods can help 
illuminate important social and technical factors that can shape bioweapons threats from 
emerging technologies.  Another valid point raised about analysis at the workshop was the issue 
of considering not only the diversity of research methods needed, but also a diversity of experts 
(to include social scientists) who can provide alternative or contrarian approaches to thinking 
about biotechnology and bioweapons threats.   
Finally, as well as the socio-technical and organizational factors that either enable or 
inhibit bioweapons development, there may well be socio-cultural motivations and taboos in 
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relation to both development and deployment of biological weapons. These factors similarly 
require social scientific investigation and are not captured by the “biotech revolution” model. As 
one intelligence practitioner (here referred to as IP2) at the workshop pointed out, bioweapons 
seem to receive relatively little investment from terrorist groups.  IP2 mentioned that according 
to journalist accounts, al Qaeda is believed to have spent approximately $2,000 on their 
bioweapons program, versus nearly $500,000 for their 11 September attacks.29 Bioweapons thus 
seem to be the least funded, least resourced type of weapon for al Qaeda. As IC2 asked, if we 
assume that capabilities are ubiquitous and that actors do have intent, why have we not seen 
more bioweapons attacks?  
One possible answer that emerged in discussion is that there may be some kind of socio-
cultural taboo against the deployment of these kinds of weapons. For example, some terrorists 
may be deterred from deploying these weapons if they would lose support from their 
constituency in using them (though the same may or may not be applicable to lone or ‘rogue’ 
scientists). On the same question of motivations, but in relation to those working in state-
sponsored bioweapons development programs, Chandre Gould pointed out that very few people 
intentionally use their knowledge and skills for ‘evil,’ as they see it. In her research case study of 
the South African chemical and biological weapons program, those involved justified their 
actions in terms of patriotism, careerism, and self-preservation.  Thus, understanding socially and 
culturally conditioned motivations and norms on both sides of state and non-state conflicts would 
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seem to be an essential step towards improving intelligence and security, both short- and long-
term.  
Furthermore, terrorists may not be interested in biological weapons due to the finicky 
nature of working with most biological organisms and the socio-organizational complexity that is 
needed to develop effective biological weapons.  Terrorists may simply find other low tech, 
conventional methods more accessible and reliable for their purposes.  At the workshop Sonia 
Ben Ouagrham-Gormley found that the bioterrorism program carried out by the Japanese 
religious group Aum Shinrikyo failed to produce any successes in its bioweapons development 
activities due to a combination of social and technical problems in the group.30Regardless of 
what explains the historical lack of terrorists’ use of biological agents, there remains validity in 
needing better analysis in order to stay ahead of how biotechnology might change to be more of 
an enabling technology for terrorism, and as terrorists interests and skills in technology may 
change in the future.   
 
2. INTELLIGENCE CULTURE AND WORK PRACTICES 
A second critical issue that emerged in the workshop discussions centered on the 
challenges of integrating new analytic approaches into existing intelligence culture, work 
practices, and priorities. Bioweapons threats attract relatively little resourcing within 
intelligence. IP2 described how intelligence analysts face resource constraints when assessing 
bioweapons threats: issues involving bioweapons have never been the ‘800-pound gorilla in the 
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room’ (in contrast to nuclear threats). Biological weapons typically receive a lower emphasis 
from intelligence managers and policymakers; the topic is often the ‘last on the list,’ and 
frequently doesn’t make it into the conversation.  Therefore, there are practical resource 
constraints that can shape what analysts are able to receive in terms of intelligence collection, 
which subsequently can shape analysis.  
In addition, it is important to examine how existing intelligence culture can shape 
analysis—even when new methods are introduced.  This is not a new problem, but a persistent 
one in intelligence that challenges efforts for analytic improvement.  Several intelligence 
practitioners at the meeting stated that intelligence analysts face pressures continually to produce 
‘current intelligence reports’ – what one intelligence practitioner at the meeting called 
‘intelligence journalism.’  With this type of work, intelligence analysts are consumed daily with 
having to keep up with producing current intelligence reports for a variety of policy customers---
this comes at the expense of developing a long-term, in-depth analytic program.31  Moreover, 
other practitioners noted that since the 2003 Iraq intelligence failures, the U.S. intelligence 
community has become highly risk averse in making analytical judgments.  At the same time, 
there is a climate of fear and anxiety amongst both policymakers and the public, who see a world 
of potential threats, particularly in light of the revolution of the life sciences which seems to have 
opened up a Pandora’s Box of bioweapons possibilities for concern.   
According to some of these practitioners at the workshop, the time pressures and risk 
aversion in intelligence have led to the development of an ‘audit culture,’ where intelligence 
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analysts rely upon checklists and structured analytic techniques in order to increase confidence in 
their judgments.  Although these tools and techniques can be useful to map out reasoning of an 
analyst’s judgment to a manager or customer, some analysts rely on these to produce a ‘correct 
answer’ instead of seeing the value more as thinking tools or ways to get analysts from different 
agencies in a room together to talk collectively about a problem.  The practitioners also noted 
that analysts also need to be able to interrogate conventional wisdom, and spend time to 
investigate whether it is accurate, instead of just relying and focusing their attention on a simple 
checklist process. According to practitioners at the workshop, a reliance on tools and checklists 
has made producing intelligence a more bureaucratic process that comes at the expense of 
building up in-depth subject-matter expertise, mentoring relationships between junior and senior 
analysts, and long-term institutional knowledge.   
Furthermore, intelligence practitioners stated that analysts face challenges in acquiring 
and processing information relating to bioweapons threats.  According to these practitioners, 
there is typically little evidence of either state or non-state actors developing biological weapons.  
By contrast, there is an overload of information about general biotechnology developments, 
which begs for better tools or conceptual aids to help the analyst sort through it.  This led to 
further discussions at the workshop about the importance of training for intelligence analysts.  
Yet practitioners noted that training is supported in some agencies more than others, and the 
quality of training can vary.  Moreover, although training and sabbatical opportunities exist, 
these involve taking analysts ‘offline’ from their analytical responsibilities, which leads to time 
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and work pressures for the analyst and his or her office. These training opportunities may also be 
cut back in an increasingly constrained resource environment.  Practitioners noted that other 
problems can emerge when analysts go away training, but then face resistance from their home 
office when they try to apply these new skills on the job.  
Related to the challenge of acquiring and processing information in the context of limited 
resources is the need to process scientific materials in languages other than English. Another 
participant noted that the assessment of biological threats tends to be based on literature reviews 
that are heavily biased towards research published in English, excluding literature in other 
languages. To obtain and review the comprehensive scientific data about a pathogen, this 
participant emphasized that access to libraries, support from skilled librarians and linguists, 
creative search strategies, advanced database handling, and the establishment and support of a 
global scientific contact network are essential. Securing resources for these crucial services is a 
question again of prioritization.  
Practitioners also noted the importance of having the right specialists and subject matter 
experts on hand to be able to analyze bioweapons- and biotechnology-related information, and 
not rely on analysts who are primarily ‘generalists’ (those who have worked on a variety of 
different accounts for short periods of time).  Given the complexity of the assessments, some 
practitioners at the meeting argued for the need to create and provide managerial support for a 
range of analytic skills and analytic teams to work on the complex array of issues—
organizational, financial, technical, and political—that can shape a weapons program, instead of 
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leaving individual analysts to handle this multifaceted problem all on their own.  Another 
signaled that because there exist longstanding problems in retaining analysts, there is little 
‘expertise’ or long-term institutional knowledge about bioweapons issues in the U.S. intelligence 
community. This can exacerbate problems of inexperienced analysts who rely on outdated 
information, faulty assumptions, or poor frameworks when making analytical judgments.   
Another practitioner (whom we call IP3) commented that pieces of analytic tradecraft in 
intelligence can be incredibly valuable, but that these pieces are not necessarily being shared, 
captured, or documented across organizations.  Therefore, this raises the question: how can one 
improve this practically or organizationally?  IP3 further commented on his experience in 
working in a tradecraft cell, where he saw the importance of the job as primarily being a 
‘therapist for analysts,’ rather than just thinking of tradecraft as a technique or tool.  IP3 
explained that with the growth in collaboration among intelligence analysts, this has meant that 
joint projects come under fire due to entrenched agency views, resulting in the analysis and 
assessment being a dynamic, never-ending process, with organizations having vested interests in 
what they have written before.  In this kind of environment, two analytic teams may take 
opposing sides and therefore they need a ‘therapist’ (tradecraft specialist) to act as a mediator to 
help the teams expose biases, understand each other’s perspective, work together, and resolve the 
conflict to find a path forward.  However, IP3 noted that the use of tradecraft in this way takes a 
lot of time, which is not always available in intelligence work.   
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Other practitioners commented on the importance of trust relationships in the production 
of knowledge for intelligence assessments.  This trust consists of formal and informal 
relationships for acquiring expertise and data, externally or internally. For example, for certain 
kinds of in-depth analysis of scientific literature, the intelligence analyst needs to develop trust 
relationships with scientists, librarians, and others to help find and gather important information.  
Other practitioners stated that there are also trust issues among intelligence analysts related to 
sharing information and databases, and the need to make the knowledge production process (and 
development of judgments) more transparent.  One academic expert at the meeting noted that the 
issues facing social science are similar to those facing intelligence in terms of the production of 
knowledge.  Both types of knowledge producer must consider how to trust sources of 
knowledge, capture institutional memory, and effectively conduct peer review processes.  The 
academic scholar explained that the social sciences have standardized methodologies, 
communities of practice, and peer review processes to aid in verifying claims and knowledge.  
Several interesting discussions at the workshop noted the divisions between intelligence 
collection and analysis, which were described by intelligence practitioners as ‘two different 
disciplines.’  The academic social scientists at the workshop found this divide puzzling and 
intriguing.  For historical and security reasons there is a rationality and logic within intelligence 
for why this separation between collection and analysis exists.  However, one academic 
participant noted that this separation then should focus analytic attention on ‘how do you do 
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knowledge production across the junctions and ensure respect between the different areas of 
work?’     
These statements by intelligence practitioners about the daily work challenges facing 
analysts highlight the persistent problems in intelligence work culture, and underscore that it is 
useful to consider how, and to what extent, new analytic approaches can be successfully adopted 
and used within existing work flows and practices, and the effort and managerial support that 
would be required for that to happen in this context.  These issues discussed at the workshop 
illuminated for the academic participants how much the academic community does not know or 
grasp about the production of knowledge in intelligence, and the utility of making that a focused 
area of research in order to help better translate academic analytic methods to an intelligence 
context.  Others at the workshop noted that academic social scientists could be brought into the 
intelligence community to document and provide insights on how knowledge is produced in 
intelligence.32  From their more distanced perspective, academic scholars can identify blind spots 
and disconnects in analyses.  Social scientists can also be useful in laying out the ways of seeing 
and framing a problem, and to be aware of the consequences of path dependencies once a 
particular framing is chosen.  Therefore the academic social scientist can play a useful outsider 
role by highlighting the analytic path that intelligence analysts are on, and drawing attention to 
alternative paths, in order to enable practitioners to see gaps and suggest new ways of 
intervening and reshaping their assessments.  
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in 
Intelligence and National Security on 14 May 2014, available online at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2014.887633  
 
Published version: K Vogel & C Knight (2015) “Analytic outreach for intelligence: 
Insights from a workshop on emerging biotechnology threats” Intelligence and National 
Security 30.4 (Published online May 2014).  
 
Please refer to the published version for citation, as copy-editing and other changes 
will have been made. If you have difficulty accessing the published version, email 
christine.knight@ed.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This U.S.-UK workshop highlighted the value of bringing new analytic insights from the 
academic social science disciplines to the problem of intelligence analysis on emerging 
bioweapons threats.  These kinds of engagements, however, can also be beneficial to academic 
scholars because they allow them to understand better the practical, working-level and 
institutional challenges that face intelligence analysts in bringing new ideas, techniques, and 
tools to their work.  Thus there is much benefit in bringing the academic and intelligence 
communities in close conversation with one another to further both communities’ understanding 
of how to improve assessments of bioweapons threats.  More initiatives along these lines should 
be supported by government and non-government funds.  In the UK, ‘Global Uncertainties’ is 
one of six Research Councils UK (RCUK) priority themes, ‘examining the causes of insecurity 
and how security risks and threats can be predicted, prevented and managed.’ Both terrorism and 
biological weapons are core areas within this theme.33 The Economic and Social Research 
Council is leading the program on behalf of RCUK, while the various UK research councils fund 
research in these areas and could support new links across the academic-security divide.     
On the US side, the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) Associates Program has been 
designed to bring multidisciplinary expertise from academia, think tanks, and the corporate 
world to the U.S. intelligence community. Although the NIC has largely drawn on conventional 
technical experts to inform the intelligence community on bioweapons threats, it could be 
expanded, with managerial support and some new resources, to bring in a larger collection of 
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social science experts to work on emerging biotechnology issues.34  Moreover, the Department 
of State’s Global Futures Forum could also be a natural counterpart to initiate these increased 
engagements, as it has a track record of engaging with a diverse set of experts in the academic 
community in an unclassified manner.  The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 
Biological Sciences Experts Group (BSEG) aims to increase academic expertise into 
intelligence, but some of the existing limitations of this Group include a primary focus on 
technical expertise, a requirement that academics obtain security clearances, and the location of 
BSEG meetings within classified spaces.35  BSEG, however, could be modified to become a 
more open and inclusive body for academic-intelligence discussions and engagements.  
Additionally, other research and engagement initiatives could be launched through the National 
Science Foundation, in an analogous fashion to Research Councils UK.   
As this workshop has illustrated, new and different ways of analyzing bioweapons-related 
technologies and threats will help policymakers, intelligence analysts, and academic scholars to 
produce better-informed judgments, advice, and decisions about national security by providing 
an understanding of the more complex and diverse character of bioweapons threats as these 
evolve in the years to come.   
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